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Corporatization and Privatization of
State-Owned Enterprises: Some
Australian Perspectives
By ToNY GREENWVOOD (MELBouRNE), DAVID WILLIAMSON
(LONDON), Jmi ARMITAGE (SYDNEY), GARY RUMBLE (CANBEr.&RA),
AND DONALD MAGAREY (BRISBANE)*
I. Introduction
Australia has throughout this century been a federation with
three tiers of government - federal, state, and municipal. For most
of the century, we have had a mixed free enterprise economy, with
government ownership of major service utilities such as electricity,
gas, water, post, telecommunications and all forms of transport. Often
the government enterprises have had monopoly power in relation to
these utilities. In addition, there has been a strong element of govern-
ment ownership in the banking and insurance fields.
One of the probable political reasons for government involve-
ment in banking and insurance has been an implied suspicion of capi-
talism, which has given rise to a desire to provide a "people's"
alternative to institutions driven solely by profit. The government,
thus, provides the competitive incentive to private sector institutions
to match fees and standards of services which have been set with
broad social good in mind as well as profit.
In the last decade in particular, it has been recognized in Austra-
lia by governments of all political persuasions, as in many other coun-
tries, that state ownership of an enterprise does not necessarily deliver
the optimum level of service or cost effectiveness to consumers; that
government enterprises involved in service delivery may benefit from
reorganization along corporate lines; that government monopolies
may perform better if faced with private sector competition; that opti-
mum development of some services requires equity capitalization that
can best be supplied by the market; and that hard pressed government
budgets can make better use of the capital funds released by the trans-
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fer of service-delivery entities to the private sector. Each of these fac-
tors has led to a restructuring of some of the government enterprises
in Australia towards corporatization and privatization.
This change in climate has seen a range of government business
enterprises (GBEs) molded into a corporate form, operating either
under the general Corporations Law, or under statutes that impose
similar requirements. It has witnessed the sale of fifty percent of the
largest bank in Australia - the Commonwealth Bank, owned by the
Federal Government - in a staged stock market float; the creation of
a structure for a private sector competitive framework for Australia's
national telecommunications carrier (Telecom); and the privatization
by sale and float of insurance companies owned by some Australian
States. Major restructuring by way of corporatization has also oc-
curred in the electricity industry. A fifty-one percent interest in one
major power station in Victoria has been sold to a private operator.
Private sector involvement is also under way in a number of other
power projects.
Nevertheless, it is the process of transforming a government unit
into a shareholding corporation, rather than the underlying philoso-
phy or ideology, which holds perhaps the most comparative legal in-
terest. We therefore wish to begin with some reflections that may be
of use to those considering whether to embark on the process. We will
draw from our experience in advising governments, both at the polit-
ical and enterprise level, as well as private sector buyers.
H. Planning for Corporatization and Privatization
Careful planning is the key to any successful corporatization or
privatization program. An effective and realistic plan is an essential
prerequisite. The price of "planning on the run" can be enormously
high. Many factors must be taken into account.
Corporatization and privatization are two distinct processes, each
with different objectives and organizational demands. A logical se-
quence and process should be designed for each stage. If the ultimate
goal is privatization, it is important to distinguish between corpora-
tization tasks and privatization tasks to ensure clear accountability
and direction throughout the program.
To be ready for privatization, most public sector bodies need to
be reorganized and private sector compliance systems need to be in-
stalled. Ideally, these steps should be taken before the privatization
process begins. Attempting all steps at once can be unmanageable.
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Moreover, many facets of a privatization transaction, such as the es-
tablishment of regulatory systems and the transfer of assets and liabili-
ties, are best undertaken while the business is still government owned.
Corporatization and privatization inevitably involve a large
number of government departments and numerous stakeholders. It is
vital, therefore, to develop and enforce a protocol for the process of
negotiation with stakeholders. This allows realistic time-frames to be
set. It also reduces the overall transaction time and cost. A critical
early decision is to decide at what point or points responsibility for
various decisions and actions passes from the government to the
newly corporatized or privatized entity.
At some stage, a full audit (or "due diligence") of the organiza-
tion, structure, and systems of a GBE to be corporatized or privatized
is necessary. Our experience suggests that the earlier this audit is per-
formed the better. The audit should identify and value all assets and
liabilities, including intangible assets such as intellectual property,
contractual rights, and contingent liabilities such as possible litigation.
Importantly, the audit should establish whether assets and liabilities
reside in the jurisdiction or elsewhere. Business interests beyond the
reach of the laws of the local jurisdiction may extend the timetable
significantly.
As a related matter, continuity of leadership is needed to manage
the process, be it corporatization or privatization. The early appoint-
ment or confirmation of appropriately experienced directors is impor-
tant to give both continuity and accountability to the process.
Similarly, the full commitment of the GBE's senior executives is criti-
cal to its success.
m. A Miscellany of Anecdotal Experience
We have encountered a range of specific issues that should be
addressed early in the planning process:
A. Contracts
Contracts which depend on the continuing status of the GBE as a
government-owned entity may be fundamentally and adversely af-
fected by the transition to a new corporate entity. Contractual ar-
rangements which are neither binding nor at arm's length (for
example, "grace and favor" accommodation and out-sourcing ar-
rangements commonly found between different arms of government)
will need to be identified and negotiated on an arm's length basis as
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part of the corporatization process prior to privatization. For exam-
ple, Victoria's sale of an interest in the Loy Yang B. Power Station
involved formalizing the arrangements between the power station and
parts of the State Electricity Commission in fundamental areas such as
the supply of power, the acquisition of fuel, and site services.
B. Conflict Between Government and Enterprise Goals
Almost inevitably there will be conflict, at least at the practical
level, between the interests of the government as owner of a privatiz-
ing GBE (the government pursues broad social and revenue goals),
and the interests, duties, and responsibilities of the GBE's directors
and officers (whose loyalty is directed towards the continuance and
prosperity of the entity). Directors and officers are likely to require
an indemnity or other protection in the course of the privatization
process.
A case in point is the reported tension between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the board of Qantas Airways Limited regarding the tim-
ing and method of the privatization of Qantas. Similar issues were
experienced in connection with the proposed privatization of Austra-
lian Airlines prior to its acquisition by Qantas. In both cases the Gov-
ernment inserted provisions into the articles of association of the
bodies, which were already incorporated, requiring the directors to
comply fully with government directives given in connection with the
sale of the government's shares on such matters as the disclosure of
confidential business information to potential buyers who also hap-
pened to be strong competitors.
C. Data Management
A large amount of information and paper is unearthed and gener-
ated during any corporatization or privatization. Sophisticated data
management systems can be used to manage this information and to
facilitate third party due diligence requirements. Any failure to put in
place effective systems will entail significant extra resources and may
lead to the assumption of greater risk by the directors.
The experience of the corporatization and subsequent privatiza-
tion of the major insurance corporation owned by the government of
the State of New South Wales (GIO Australia) underscores the impor-
tance of an early due diligence review and the establishment of an
appropriate information technology system during the corporatization
phase. The GIO Australia database indexed thousands of key source
[Vol. 17:741
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documents. This database (prepared with the assistance of our firm)
has proved to be a valuable management resource. It has been main-
tained by GIO Australia as a method of organizing its collection of
"cornerstone" company documentation for the ongoing use of its
board and management.
D. Regulatory Framework
Where a GBE has the dual roles of service provider and regula-
tor, the regulatory framework may need to be redesigned. The con-
tinuing regulatory role, if any, of a corporatized or privatized entity
should be reviewed, especially if new competitors are to be intro-
duced. One option is to create a new regulator. Another option in a
deregulated environment is to do without any regulator, leaving dis-
putes to be resolved within the existing legal framework. The right
regulatory structure is a crucial early decision for policy makers.
With the introduction of competitors to Telecom Australia, the
previous Federal telecommunications monopoly, Austel was estab-
lished as the primary government regulator of Australia's telecommu-
nications industry.1 In contrast, the option of reliance on the general
legal framework was followed in New Zealand. Critics have sug-
gested, however, that the New Zealand model can be exploited by a
former monopolist prepared to use litigation as a commercial weapon.
If private-sector competitors are to be introduced into a particu-
lar industry for the first time, the regulations governing competition
should be reviewed. Policy makers should decide, for example,
whether the former GBE and its competitors need special powers not
available to ordinary corporations.
The Telecommunications Act gave the new Australian entrant,
Optus, as well as Telecom Australia, the right to construct facilities on
land owned by third parties. It also required Optus to contribute to
the cost of providing community service obligations.
E. Employment Structure
Employees are major stakeholders in a corporatization or priva-
tization. Some of the employment-related problems arising when a
government enterprise is sold to the private sector include the effect
1. Our Trade Practices Commission also deals with critical matters such as misleading
advertising. Telecom was found by that Commission to have breached statutory standards
on numerous occasions during the phase in which its chief competitor was establishing
initial market share.
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on existing employment contracts; accrued entitlements; special bene-
fits; and rights of appeal and review in relation to appointment, pro-
motion, grading, and disciplinary action. The continuing effect of
affirmative action and anti-discrimination laws, which have particular
application to government employment, and the processes for setting
remuneration, job classification, industrial awards and determinations,
and union coverage will all require resolution.
Beyond these technical issues is the reality that a different labor-
relations culture commonly exists in the public sector from that in the
private sector. The successful adoption of a new culture requires deli-
cate handling and skillful management.
In the case of the corporatization of GIO Australia, an important
early task was the transfer of union coverage of employees from state
and federal public sector unions to the finance sector union.
A major employee-related issue is the transfer of superannuation
arrangements. This can give rise to very complicated issues and indus-
trial negotiation. The transfer of employee entitlements from public
sector funds to other funds may require legislation and the favorable
exercise of the discretion vested in the Insurance and Superannuation
Commissioner. Moreover, until recently many public servants have
been beneficiaries of retirement benefit schemes under which prom-
ised benefits, including generous pensions, have been funded by gov-
ernments only as actual liabilities arise. The severance of employees
from such benefits, which have often been understood as part of the
trade-off for a lower remuneration structure in government services,
may present an issue that can only be resolved by acceptance by the
government of long term liabilities for the individuals concerned.
This problem was dealt with in the State of Victoria by special
legislation which provided that State Insurance Office employees
transferring to the purchaser (GIO Australia) remained members of
the State Superannuation Fund for a limited period or. in the case of
longstanding members, for a longer period.
IV. Legal Implications of Corporatization
Although commonly regarded as a mere stepping stone in prepa-
ration for privatization, corporatization also has substantial reasons
for being adopted for its own sake. Apart from being an overt, or
covert, preparation for privatization, the principal motive for embark-
ing upon the corporatization of an existing statutory corporation or
other government entity is said to be to increase the general efficiency
[Vol. 17:741
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of the operation. This is to be achieved in particular by introducing a
much higher degree of accountability, with emphasis on performance-
oriented requirements and requiring the corporatized body to com-
pete on an equal, or substantially equal, footing with corresponding
non-government-owned enterprises. Corporatization can also provide
an opportunity to remove inappropriate elements from an existing en-
tity or operation.
A. Methodology
The most obvious way to work toward these objectives, and the
one which has so far been adopted by the Federal Government and by
the State of New South Wales, is to establish the corporatized body as
a corporation under the ordinary legislation governing the formation
of corporations. (The State of Victoria, on the other hand, has
adopted a more complex staging process that will be discussed sepa-
rately below.)
Incorporation as a company can be achieved in either of two
ways. The first is "incorporation and vesting." This is incorporating in
the ordinary way, with appropriate government nominees as the
shareholders, and then vesting the relevant enterprise, with its attend-
ant assets and liabilities, in that company by or pursuant to special
legislation. The second way is "conversion." This entails "converting"
an existing statutory corporation into a company by deeming it, by or
pursuant to special legislation, to be registered under the ordinary
companies' legislation when specified requirements have been satis-
fied, including the lodging of appropriate memoranda, articles of asso-
ciation, and the allotment of share capital to the relevant government
or its nominees.
New South Wales has opted for the incorporation and vesting
method, as evidenced by the State Owned Corporations Act of 1989
and the consequent Corporatisation Acts of the State Bank and the
Grain Handling Authority; whereas the Commonwealth has in the
cases of Australian Airlines, OTC (a telecommunications company),
ANL (a national shipping line), and the Snowy Mountains Engineer-
ing Corporation, adopted the conversion method.
The conversion method is simpler, more direct, and has the major
advantage that it does not involve the introduction of a new legal
entity.
The incorporation and vesting method, on the other hand, may
have the advantage of flexibility. It could be more appropriate, for
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example, where there is difficulty in identifying the assets and liabili-
ties of the existing entity, where the existing entity or operation is ac-
customed to using assets or facilities which do not belong to it, or
where it is not intended that the whole of the existing enterprise or the
whole of its assets be transferred to the new entity. It is also more
appropriate where it is desired to divide up the existing enterprise into
two or more parts, each of which can either be corporatized separately
or omitted from the corporatization exercise.
B. Incorporation and Vesting - Extra-Territorial Operation
Apart from being more cumbrous, the major problem with the
incorporation and vesting method is that the transfer of assets and
liabilities, by force of a statute or of some action provided for in the
statute, and the substitution of the new entity for the previous one in
all existing legal relationships, may be effective only in the jurisdiction
where that statute can apply. If the existing entity has activities
outside that jurisdiction, the enabling statute alone may not be suffi-
cient to complete the transfer of the enterprise to the new entity.
This difficulty appears to be recognized in the Australian Industry
Development Corporation Amendment Act 1988 (strictly a case of
direct provision for disposal and privatization, rather than for
corporatization) which contains a provision for extra territorial opera-
tion "to the greatest extent possible," and for the existing entity to
"take such steps as are necessary to ensure that [the legislation] is
fully effective, particularly in relation to its operation outside Austra-
lia." That last mentioned obligation requires the existing entity to
take whatever action might be necessary in another jurisdiction,
where the Australian Act does not operate, to effect the transfer to
the new entity of assets situated in that other jurisdiction. Of course,
action by the existing entity may not in some cases be effective by
itself to achieve the transfer of an asset. For example, the transfer
might require the consent of a third party in which case the achieve-
ment of the full transfer of the assets to the new entity could be
frustrated.
A more formidable problem arises where the existing entity has
liabilities to parties in a jurisdiction where the enabling legislation -
despite its proclaimed extra-territoriality - is simply not effective.
The parties to whom those liabilities are owed, or with whom con-
tracts exist, may not be prepared to accept the substitution; and if the
Australian legislation purports to dissolve the existing entity without
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its responsibilities in other jurisdictions being effectively transferred to
the new entity, serious complexities can result.
The New South Wales Investment Corporation (Sale) Act of 1988
contains provisions as to the vesting of assets and liabilities and the
substitution of the new entity as required, but does not either attempt
to claim extra-territorial operation or oblige the transferring authority
to take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the vesting provi-
sions of the Act are fully effective. The New South Wales State
Owned Corporations Act similarly ignores the problems with respect
to assets, liabilities, and arrangements outside New South Wales.
This particular problem does not arise where the conversion
method of corporatization mentioned above is employed, that is,
where the entity conducting the enterprise does not change, but
merely has its status changed to that of an incorporated company.
Nevertheless, even in such a case a corresponding problem arises if it
is intended that some part of the assets or liabilities or other commit-
ments should not be retained by the corporatized entity, but should be
transferred to some other entity nominated by the relevant govern-
ment. In that case there would be the same difficulties as mentioned
earlier regarding the effectiveness of the relevant legislation in other
jurisdictions where assets and liabilities are situated.
C. Conversion - Asset Title
The conversion method of corporatization has its own problem.
In each particular case it needs to be determined whether the assets
which the entity to be corporatized holds at the time of its translation
into an ordinary company are in fact beneficially owned by it and not
merely held on behalf of the state or some other entity owned or con-
trolled by the government.
This is not just a matter of identification of the relevant assets.
Even if the entity concerned is fully constituted as a statutory corpora-
tion with the power and authority to acquire, hold, and dispose of
assets, it does not necessarily follow that the assets held by it belong to
it in the ordinary way. Further statutory or other legal action might
be necessary to achieve that result either at the stage when corpora-
tization is effected or at the later stage of privatization.
In some cases, all of the assets are in fact beneficially owned by
the relevant entity. However, this conclusion cannot flow merely
from the fact that under its constituting statute the existing entity has
a stated amount of capital which, under the statute converting it to a
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company, is to be converted into shares allotted to the relevant gov-
ernment or its nominees in satisfaction of the obligation under the
constituting statute to repay that capital as and when required. It
would appear, at least in some circumstances, that the beneficial own-
ership of the relevant assets by the corporatized body may be limited
to the amount of the capital which was converted into shares, and may
not extend to the assets insofar as their value exceeds that amount
unless this result is expressly provided for by legislation.
D. The New South Wales and Federal Approaches
Because of the method adopted by the Federal Government to
convert existing entities into ordinary corporations under the General
Corporations Law, each case has been dealt with by legislation
amending or replacing the statute under which the relevant body was
constituted. The arrangements made for OTC (overseas telecommu-
nications), ANL (shipping), Snowy Mountains Engineering Corpora-
tion, and Australian Airlines were substantially the same.
In contrast, the New South Wales State Owned Corporations Act
provides an umbrella structure for the corporatization of any New
South Wales authority or enterprise, but the creation of any particular
state-owned corporation can only be affected by a special statute
which inserts the corporation's name in the First Schedule to the State
Owned Corporations Act. That special statute can also make any
other provision, whether in addition to, or in variation or exclusion of,
the provisions of the State Owned Corporations Act in relation to the
establishment of the relevant body as a state-owned corporation.
The State Owned Corporations Act authorizes the making of reg-
ulations providing for the transfer of assets and liabilities to a state-
owned corporation and for the substitution of the state-owned corpo-
ration for the state in contracts and other existing legal proceedings.
For the corporatization of the State Bank of New South Wales and the
Grain Handling Authority, provision for the transfer of assets and lia-
bilities and other associated arrangements have been made by special
statutes designating State Bank of New South Wales Limited and
NSW Grain Corporation Limited as state-owned corporations. In
each case, it is provided that the transfers and other arrangements will
take effect by authority of the relevant statute. The trigger will be an
order by the relevant minister which will detail that which is to be
transferred, the consideration for the transfer, and the value or
amount of assets and liabilities.
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The point made earlier about the extra-territorial difficulties
under the incorporation and vesting method of corporatization is
more significant in the case of a State entity than in the case of a
national entity, because it applies to assets, liabilities, and other ar-
rangements outside the State concerned, and not merely to those
outside Australia.
In the case of federal bodies, the only stipulation with regard to
ownership of the corporatized body is that the shares created from the
original capital must be issued to the Commonwealth (i.e., to Australia
as a political entity) or to nominees of the Commonwealth. It is not
entirely clear whether the expression "nominees of the Common-
wealth" means merely persons nominated by the federal government,
or whether it also implies that the shares will be held by such persons
as trustees for the Commonwealth. Assuming that the term "nomi-
nees" has the implication that the shares are to be held in trust, which
is the way the government sees the matter, there is no stipulation in
any of the relevant Federal statutes that the memorandum and articles
of association of the relevant bodies must require the shares to con-
tinue to be so held until a departure from that requirement is author-
ized by a statute. In contrast, the New South Wales State Owned
Corporations Act does contain such a stipulation.
The New South Wales State Owned Corporations Act makes a
number of other stipulations concerning the contents of the memoran-
dum and articles of association, not only of the corporatized body, but
also of any subsidiaries which it may have or acquire. None of the
relevant federal statutes make any such stipulations, specifying only
that the body being corporatized must lodge "a proposed memoran-
dum, and proposed articles" with the Australian Securities Commis-
sion, which administers the Corporations Law.
The various Commonwealth statutes affecting conversions to in-
corporated companies generally make no provisions regarding gov-
ernment guarantees. However, an exception was made in the case of
Australian Airlines. Provision was made for a Commonwealth guar-
antee to apply in respect to any liabilities which were already guaran-
teed by the Commonwealth, but which were redistributed to different
members of the group. On the other hand, while the State Owned
Corporations Act expressly provides that the obligations of a state-
owned corporation or any of its subsidiaries are not guaranteed by the
State of New South Wales, the Act qualifies this by adding: "except to
the extent that the Board of the Corporation and voting shareholders
agree in writing." Of the two examples of corporatization under that
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Act which have been considered, the State Bank (Corporatization)
Act provides for a general guarantee of the obligations of the corpora-
tized body to continue "until a day to be appointed by the Governor
by a proclamation." The Grain Handling Authority (Corporatization)
Act made no reference to any such guarantee.
V. Corporatization - The Victorian Legislation
The processes established by the Victorian State Owned Enter-
prises Act of 1992 are worth reviewing in more detail since the Act is
the most recent Australian legislative treatment of corporatization
and appears to have drawn on the earlier experience of both federal
and state jurisdictions.
The Victorian Act is considerably more flexible than the corpora-
tization legislation in other jurisdictions. It provides choices from
amongst three models of corporate form: (1) a specially created statu-
tory corporation known as a State Body; (2) a statutory corporation
established under its own Act; and (3) a company incorporated under
the Corporations Law known as a State Owned Company (SOC).
Either of the first two may be corporatized and known as a State Busi-
ness Corporation.
There are also two possible processes of corporatization: (1) con-
version, and (2) incorporation and vesting. These two processes may
be used in combination.
There are also various methods of "unbundling" existing govern-
ment business enterprises. An overview of the choices and the rela-
tive characteristics of the entities regulated by the Act are set out in
Diagram 1.
Phased implementation of corporatization is made possible by
the ability to convert through more than one process to more than one
model. It is also possible to temporarily designate an enterprise a "re-
organizing body" for the purposes of its commercialization or un-
bundling while under Government control.
A. Entities Regulated by the Act
The Act regulates statutory corporations and companies which
are brought within its operation by a Reorganizing Body, a State
Body, a State Business Corporation (SBC), or a State Owned Corpo-
ration (SOC).
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1. Reorganizing Body
An existing statutory corporation may be designated a Reorga-
nizing Body under the Act. It is an intermediate step to an SBC or
SOC, permitting commercialization or unbundling in preparation for
corporatization. It may be unbundled by the transfer of assets to sub-
sidiaries, other entities, or the state. A Reorganizing Body ceases to
be designated as such upon a further declaration, most likely when
being converted to an SBC or SOC.
2. State Body
This is a new form of statutory corporation which may be estab-
lished pursuant to the Act. It has a flexible form, determined by the
Governor in Council (i.e., Executive Government), including the pos-
sibility of a share capital. It also has the ability to be a subsidiary of
another statutory corporation whether or not it has a share capital. It
is principally intended to be a repository of functions of a reorganizing
body which is being unbundled and may remain as a statutory corpo-
ration or be converted to an SBC or SOC. Its flexible form enables it
to be established according to commercialization and corporatization
principles at the outset, or to take a more traditional form for the
performance of regulatory functions. A State Body may have subsidi-
aries. These can be other State Bodies, SOCs, or ordinary companies.
3. State Business Corporation (SBC)
An SBC is an existing statutory corporation, or State Body,
which, by designation under the Act, comes to owe its structure, or-
ganization, procedures, and certain other features of newly corpora-
tized status to the Act. It is an end in itself, being a corporatized
entity, but may be converted into an SOC. It generally has a fixed
form of constitution, board, objectives, powers, corporate planning,
reporting processes, dividend mechanism, tax equivalent and other
features of a corporatized body. An SBC may have subsidiaries (State
Bodies, SOCs, or ordinary companies). In contrast with an SOC, an
SBC is wholly regulated by Victorian legislation - by this act and
potentially other acts - with, in theory, greater scope for Ministerial
involvement, despite corporatized "arm's length" status.
4. State Owned Company (SOC)
An SOC is a company incorporated, or deemed to be incorpo-
rated, under the Corporations Law. It can be created by conversion
1994]
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Characteristics
Diagram 1
of Entities Regulated by the Act
Context/Purpose Process
Typ Transitional rinal Reach By N Fully PossibleStep Status Converso Estbwe Corporitized' Subrdid s
Reorganizing , State Body # Subsldiary
Body V/ .SOC maybesold
* Company
State Body Possib Potentially, • State Body * Subsdiary
t sdepends on *SOC may be solddesign * Company
SBC State Body 9 Subsldlary
V/V/SOC maybe sold*Company
SOC SOC *SOC itself,
V V VV *Company or subsldia'may be sol
from a traditional statutory corporation, State Body, or SBC; or it can
be established under the Act or, in the case of a pre-existing company,
brought within the scope of the Act. Arrangements may be made to
vest public sector assets and liabilities in an SOC, whether it be con-
verted from an existing GBE or a new "shell." An SOC has most of
the features of a non-government-owned company and is subject to
company law. However, within the flexibility permitted by that law,
some aspects of its affairs are regulated by the Act, and other matters
may be controlled by the government as shareholder through its arti-
cles of association. It may have a subsidiary company which is not
itself an SOC by definition, but is subject to similar requirements
under the Act. This is a form which can be wholly privatized by the
sale of shares in the company rather than particular assets.
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B. Creation of Corporatized Entities
The four types of entities regulated by the Act acquire their sta-
tus by different routes. State Bodies are created by the exercise of
powers conferred by the Act. SOCs are either created afresh by in-
corporation under the Corporations Law, or are created by conver-
sion under the Act from any of the other types of entities. Diagram 2




Created by (existiig body corporate)Governor h
Council
STATE BODY "REORGANIZING BODY'
(Statutory corporation s;ubject
to new powers of Government)
STATE BUSINESS CORPORATION
STATE OWNED COMPANY
A State Body may be designated a Reorganizing Body. How-
ever, as a practical matter that option would not be pursued since it
would not advance the extent of corporatization. In fact, the Gover-
nor in Council's powers over a State Body far exceed the powers over
a Reorganizing Body.
C. Possible Unbundling of Reorganizing Bodies
Designation of a statutory corporation as a Reorganizing Body
empowers the Governor in Council to direct the creation of subsidiar-
ies and the unbundling of responsibilities and activities of the Reorga-
nizing Body into new or existing subsidiaries or other parts of the
1994]
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public sector.
Government.
Diagram 3 summarizes the options available to the
Diagram 3
Enterprise Assets Reorganization
The State (Minister/Treasurer) )
ANOTHER shares
shares STATUTORY CORPORATION r
(inc. SBC, subsidiary of SBC, relationship
State body)@
Broadly speaking, there are the following seven unbundling options to
which an asset of a Reorganizing Body may be transferred: (1) a
wholly owned subsidiary company; (2) a wholly owned subsidiary
State Body; (3) a State Body not controlled by the Reorganizing
Body, but controlled by the state, a traditional statutory corporation,
an SBC or its subsidiary, or another State Body; (4) a wholly owned
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subsidiary SOC; (5) an SOC not controlled by the Reorganizing Body,
but controlled by the state, a traditional statutory corporation, an SBC
or its subsidiary, or a State Body; (6) a traditional statutory corpora-
tion, SBC, or a subsidiary of an SBC; or (7) the state.
D. Possible Unbundling of an SBC or SoC
Once a reorganizing body has become an SBC or SOC, or where
assets and activities reside in an SBC or SOC, unbundling is still possi-
ble but not at the immediate direction of the government. Examples
of such unbundling are the transfer of assets and activities into a sub-
sidiary or the sale of assets, including the sale of shares in a subsidiary.
In the case of an SBC, the government would effect the un-
bundling through the corporate plan process, in which the relevant
minister and treasurer (in consultation with the board or ultimately by
direction) may cause the adoption of a business plan to effect un-
bundling, restructuring, or divestiture of assets.
Unbundling of an SOC would require action by the board of the
SOC, as for any company. Such action may, of course, be suggested
by the government, and it is subject to the government's controls in
the articles of association with some requirements of shareholder ap-
proval for matters relating to ownership of subsidiaries and sale or
disposal of main undertakings.
E. Assimilation to Federal Law
An objective of the Act is to establish SOEs as fully "corpora-
tized" entities. On that basis, a tax equivalent provision provides that
the treasurer may direct the payment to the Consolidated Fund of an
amount equivalent to the federal taxes an enterprise would pay if it
were subject to federal tax. The Act provides for the appointment of
a tax assessor, and it is expected that further machinery provisions will
be set out in regulations under the Act.
Since corporatization may take an enterprise outside the protec-
tion of the shield of the Crown, a provision is included for giving tem-
porary relief from the application of the restrictive trade practices
provisions of the Trade Practices Act. The relief is intended to be for
an interim period while the enterprise prepares for compliance.
VI. State (Crown) Immunity
The special immunity of the Crown must be reviewed as part of
the corporatization process.
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The Crown, including ministers and many statutory bodies, can
be subject to statutory law. In each case, however, it is a matter of
ascertaining the legislature's intent, taking into account the presump-
tion that the Crown is not bound except by express words or by neces-
sary implication. The presumption of Crown immunity from statute is
not subject to an exception with respect to commercial activities of the
Crown. In a very recent decision, however, the High Court has ques-
tioned the appropriateness of the presumption in the context of com-
mercial activities.
A Crown servant is subject to the law, and merely acting in the
course of his employment will not entitle the servant to the Crown's
immunity. He is entitled to immunity only if it can be established that
compliance with a statute would prejudice the Crown. The Crown is,
however, subject to the common law.
In the context of Australia's Corporations Law, the Crown is ex-
pressly bound only by the provisions governing arrangements and re-
constructions; and the provisions which may be broadly categorized as
"external administration," such as receivership and winding up.
From the government's point of view, the shield of the Crown
doctrine has the following advantages with respect to its ownership
and control of shares in a privatized corporation: if the privatized cor-
poration is listed, the government, as a substantial shareholder owning
five percent or more, is not required to disclose its entitlement and
changes in its entitlement to shares in the company, as required by the
substantial shareholding provision of the Act; the Government, as a
shareholder, can acquire shares in the privatized corporation without
complying with the takeover provisions;2 and the government, as a
shareholder, is not exposed to some of the remedies available to dis-
gruntled minority shareholders who consider, and can satisfy a court,
that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner that
is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly discriminatory with re-
spect to a member or members, or in a manner that is contrary to the
interests of the members as a whole.
As noted above, since the crown is expressly bound by the wind-
ing up provisions in the companies' legislation, the government, as a
shareholder, is subject to the right of a minority shareholder to seek
an order that the company be wound up on the "just and equitable"
2. Broadly speaking, the takeover provisions provide that a person may only acquire
in excess of twenty percent of the voting shares in a company in certain permitted ways
(e.g., a takeover bid).
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ground (Le., on the basis that the affairs of the company are being
conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or
unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members, or in a manner
that is contrary to the interests of the members as a whole). Further-
more, the government is liable to contribute to a winding up to the
extent of any unpaid calls on any partly paid shares held by the gov-
eminent in the company.
The "shield of the Crown" rules are unlikely to apply to the cor-
poration itself once privatized through the introduction of non-gov-
ernment equity, unless special legislation expressly makes the
corporation an "agent of the Crown" or it can be established that it
operates under a very high degree of ministerial control. Unless min-
isterial control is total, a court is unlikely to find the privatized corpo-
ration to be a Crown Agent.
Similarly, the Corporations Law is applicable to non-government
owners and controllers of shares in the privatized corporation.
The question of state immunity from the application of statutes is
one of some difficulty, and the difficulty of determining whether it
applies in a particular case appears to have been increased rather than
reduced by the Australian High Court in its most recent ruling. The
flexible approach enunciated by the High Court appears to aggravate
the uncertainty not only as to whether a particular statute applies gen-
erally to a particular body representing the state, but also as to
whether, if the body itself is immune from that statute, it may never-
theless apply to certain actions of persons acting on behalf of that
body.
When corporatized bodies are still wholly-owned and controlled
by the relevant government, a way of avoiding the problem of deter-
mining whether or not state immunity applies is for the corporatizing
statute to specify clearly that the corporatized body will not be a man-
ifestation of the state or otherwise represent it. This has been done in
each of the statutes relating to the conversion into companies of Aus-
tralian Airlines, OTC, ANL, and Snowy Mountains Engineering Cor-
poration, but with the qualification "except so far as express provision
is made by a law or the Commonwealth, State or Territory, as the case
may be, or the Regulations otherwise provide."
The New South Wales State Owned Corporations Act contains a
similar provision with a corresponding qualification, but the principal
stipulation that an SOC "is not and does not represent the State" is
further qualified by the words "except by express agreement with the
voting shareholders of the corporation." The implications of the last
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mentioned qualification are uncertain. It is difficult to come to terms
with the concept that the government and the relevant corporation
can determine by agreement that the corporation will acquire immu-
nity from those statutes which do not bind the Crown, if that is in fact
what the qualification purports to mean.
VII. Legislative Power
In a federal system such as Australia's, the issue of legislative
power must be kept in mind in preparing a statutory approach.
It is obvious that constitutional questions can arise in corporatiza-
tion legislation as to the competence of the relevant legislature. How-
ever, if the existing legislation constituting the body now to be
corporatized and authorizing its activities is within the powers con-
ferred on the Federal Parliament, then the legislation translating that
body into an incorporated company should also be within those pow-
ers. This assumption is founded on the proposition that the body
could have been established pursuant to federal legislation as an in-
corporated company in the first instance. Therefore, legislation
merely changing the body's status, but not its authorized activities,
must still relate to the same head or heads of federal legislative power
on which the original legislation was based.
None of the Commonwealth statutes relating to the conversion of
Australian Airlines, OTC, ANL, and Snowy Mountains Engineering
Corporation to companies stipulates that the authorized activities of
those companies are to be confined in any way by their memoranda or
articles of association. Accordingly, the full range of powers available
under the Corporations Law can be conferred on them if their memo-
randa and articles do not in fact restrict them. That is to say, such
legislation can be regarded as legislation authorizing the establish-
ment of a body capable of carrying on activities which might have no
relationship at all to the activities which that body had originally been
constituted to conduct, and on which the connection with the relevant
head or heads of Federal legislative power had depended. If this is so,
it might be doubted whether the legislation to effect the translation of
the body into an incorporated company with unrestricted powers is
within the powers of the Federal Parliament unless some head or
heads of power, other than those relied on for the original establish-
ment of the body, can be invoked. Since federal legislation powers do
not extend to the incorporation of corporations, the government's act
of establishing a corporation by incorporation under the Corporations
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Law must be undertaken for some other valid legislative purpose. On
the other hand, once the certificate of incorporation has issued, the
corporation so created would seem to have the full range of ordinary
corporate powers held by any corporation, and it is unlikely that an
attack on corporate activity itself as being unconstitutional would be
successful.
VIIL Financial Issues
Any corporatization or privatization will in many cases require a
renegotiation of existing financing arrangements of the public enter-
prise in question. The following legislative, quasi-legislative, and ad-
ministrative matters will need to be addressed:
A. Methodology
The enterprise's obligations under its existing financing arrange-
ments will be a major part of the overall liabilities of the enterprise.
Any legislation to corporatize or privatize an enterprise will generally
require fewer amendments to the existing financing documentation,
and fewer consents from the relevant lenders, if it retains the same
legal entity for the enterprise and simply changes its status into a com-
pany subject to the Corporations Law, rather than creating a new
legal entity to which the assets and liabilities of the public enterprise
need to be transferred.
B. Capital Adequacy Guidelines
The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has issued guidelines
which impose capital adequacy requirements on all Australian Banks.
These are broadly in line with the corresponding requirements intro-
duced by the Bank for International Settlements. Under the RBA
guidelines, a bank's loan assets are rated according to the risk weight-
ing attaching to the particular borrower.
A weighting of ten percent applies to most claims on federal or
state governments. Claims on Australian local governments and non-
corporate public sector entities carry a twenty percent weighting. Im-
portantly, however, public sector trading enterprises which have cor-
porate status or are required to operate on a commercial basis carry a
hundred percent weighting.
Accordingly, an enterprise which is currently subject to the
twenty percent risk weighting is likely, upon corporatization, to move
into the hundred percent category. This will impose an extra cost on
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the banks which lend to the enterprise, and in most cases the banks
will be entitled to be reimbursed by the enterprise for that increase in
cost under the terms of the loan documentation.
C. Borrowing Levy Act
Under this legislation, many Federal Government enterprises are
liable to pay to the Federal Government a levy, not exceeding 0.5 per-
cent per annum, on their borrowings. It is understood that the ration-
ale for this is that the federal ownership of these enterprises carries an
implicit government guarantee, if not an express one, and that the en-
terprises have therefore been able to raise funds at a lower cost than
would be the case in the absence of federal ownership. The levy is
intended as a fee to the Federal Government for providing the source
of this benefit.
If an enterprise which is currently subject to the levy is privatized,
it would be appropriate for the Act to be amended to remove the
imposition of the levy on that enterprise. Where an enterprise is only
partially privatized, the question becomes less clear. Logically, at
least some reduction in the rate of levy applicable to that enterprise
would seem appropriate.
D. Loan Council Global Limits
The Loan Council represents the federal and state governments
as a mechanism to regulate the overall level of Australian sovereign
debt.
Under the "Global Limit" approach adopted by the Loan Coun-
cil in 1984, borrowing and other methods of financing by federal and
state governments and their respective government enterprises have
been subject to Global Limits determined by the Loan Council.
The corporatization of a government enterprise will not be
enough to remove it from the scope of the Global Limits. However,
where the enterprise is wholly privatized, it seems clear that the
Global Limits will cease to apply to it.
The position is less clear with a partial privatization. The Federal
Treasury has indicated that in determining whether there is sufficient
private involvement in a project or enterprise to take it outside the
scope of the Global Limits, the primary consideration will be the level
of government control over the project or enterprise. This suggests
that if a government retains a shareholding of more than fifty percent
in an enterprise, the Global Limits would continue to apply to it. A
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minority government shareholding, however, should not be sufficient
to prevent the enterprise from falling outside the scope of the Global
Limits, unless there is some supervening measure of control which the
government retains over the enterprise.
In cases of doubt, it is appropriate to seek a ruling from the Loan
Council, because any uncertainty in the minds of financiers will likely
operate to the detriment of the enterprise.
E. Dealings with Financiers
Perhaps more important to an enterprise than the legislative and
administrative matters just mentioned, in terms of the potential im-
pact on the enterprise's borrowing costs, is the enterprise's dealings
with its existing financiers and, if applicable, the rating agencies.
Little may be required in this area in the case of a corporatization
if the enterprise continues as the same legal entity with simply the
adoption of a corporate form. Communication with the enterprise's
financiers is, of course, essential to assure them that the enterprise's
financial obligations remained unaffected. In many cases the finan-
ciers will want to see a legal opinion to this effect.
In the case of a privatization, however, other considerations ap-
ply. The enterprise's existing financiers can be expected to be very
interested in the extent of the privatization, the structure of the priva-
tization, and the indemnity of any future controlling or significant
shareholders. If the enterprise has debt which has been rated by one
of the rating agencies, they too will take a very close interest in these
matters.
Particular features of the financing arrangements, to which the
financiers and rating agencies can be expected to pay close scrutiny,
include change of ownership, financial covenants, and negative
pledges.
1. Change of Ownership Clauses
Where an enterprise has raised money with an explicit govern-
ment guarantee, the continued existence and enforceability of that
guarantee will invariably be a condition of the financing. If the guar-
antee is removed, which typically constitutes a default, cross-default
clauses in the enterprise's other financing arrangements will be
triggered.
Where the enterprise has not had an explicit government guaran-
tee, its existing financing commonly includes a so-called "change of
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ownership" clause. These clauses come in a variety of forms. A typi-
cal clause is triggered by a reduction of the relevant federal or state
shareholding in the enterprise below a specified level. It is common
for a reduction in government shareholding to fifty percent or less to
be sufficient to trigger the clause.
The effect of triggering such a clause varies depending on the
terms of the financing arrangements. In some cases it constitutes a
default - again possibly triggering cross-default clauses in other facil-
ities. In other cases it will entitle the financier to require the provision
of security to its satisfaction. In other cases again, it will merely trig-
ger, in the first instance, a renegotiation of the terms of the financing.
In almost all cases, however, if the clause is triggered and the
enterprise does not agree to any new requirements of the financiers,
the financiers are entitled to withdraw their facilities and require re-
payment of any outstanding debts.
Discussions with an enterprise's existing financiers are an ex-
tremely sensitive and important aspect of any privatization. Properly
handled, the existing financing arrangements can be expected to re-
main in place with minimal additional borrowing cost to the enter-
prise. If improperly handled, the viability of the entire privatization
can be thrown into jeopardy.
2. Financial Covenants
In the absence of government ownership, an enterprise can ex-
pect that its financiers will want to impose certain financial disciplines
on the enterprise, consistent with their approach to other private-sec-
tor corporate borrowers. Typical financial covenants include ratio re-
quirements for working capital, net tangible assets, and interest cover.
Agreeing on definitions of these terms, especially any specific inclu-
sions and exclusions, can be a time-consuming process in the loan
renegotiations.
After privatization, enterprises can expect much less leniency
from financiers when negotiating events of default. The scope of any
cross-default clause, the number of days of grace applicable to pay-
ment and other defaults, and the inclusion of a general event of de-
fault covering a material adverse change in the enterprise's financial
condition, are areas where government-owned borrowers have en-
joyed terms which are much less stringent than those typically applica-
ble to private-sector corporate borrowers.
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3. Security or Negative Pledge
Where an enterprise has previously borrowed on an unsecured
basis, financiers will often seek the provision of security following a
privatization. The enterprise will need to decide whether it has any
assets which are possible or appropriate to offer as security, and what
the appropriate arrangements might be to preserve the intended rela-
tivity between the enterprise's various financiers. The conferring of
security over existing assets may well have substantial duty implica-
tions, depending on the location of the assets in question.
If facilities are to remain unsecured, the financiers can be ex-
pected to require significantly more stringent forms of negative pledge
than they have from some government-owned enterprises in the past.
The negotiation of negative-pledge clauses will assume an increased
importance, and the enterprise should ensure that it retains sufficient
flexibility, by way of exceptions to its negative-pledge clause, to un-
dertake the types of project financing that it might wish to enter into
in the future.
The negotiation of appropriate terms with an enterprise's existing
financiers can be expected to take some time. This is particularly true
for those enterprises which have numerous and diverse existing fi-
nancing arrangements. It is more important to get the arrangements
right than to have them concluded quickly. If they are concluded
quickly at the expense of getting them right, the enterprise will usually
give away more than it needs to, which in turn will make the enter-
prise less attractive to private-sector owners.
Financiers easily become nervous. It takes a careful program of
nurturing the financiers through the privatization process to achieve
the key objectives of maximizing the value of the enterprise and
avoiding the damaging consequences which might result from any pre-
cipitous action which the banks might take under the terms of the
existing financing documents.
In many cases, an interim solution will need to be found if the
privatization is to proceed quickly. One such solution may be the pro-
vision of an explicit government guarantee for a transitional period
following privatization to allow the loan renegotiations to take place
in an orderly fashion. This will be one of the options to be weighed in
reaching an appropriate balance between the competing desires of
concluding the privatization quickly, minimizing any resultant dam-
age, and maximizing the price achieved.
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IX. Conclusion
Legal practitioners in the private sector are always presented with
a range of new and interesting legal issues when given the opportunity
to give advice on the transfer of a government enterprise into the cap-
ital marketplace. The Australian experience has shown, however, that
some of the legal issues are sufficiently generic to be addressed by
legislation dealing with general principles.
